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I. INTRODUCTION
Much has changed in the world of communications in the last several
years. A quarter century ago, the suggestion of watching year-old motion
pictures at home was almost laughable. The concept of a computer that
could be manufactured to fit within a room was still taking shape. Society
would not see personal computers become truly prominent until the late
1980s. The notion of an Internet or World Wide Web-sized database was
unthinkable.
Times have indeed changed. Year-old movies are watched on video-
tape, and some computers are manufactured to fit in the palm of a hand.
Gone are libraries' card catalogs, as online computer terminals have re-
placed them. Legal research can actually be done at home. Like it or not,
the Information Age is here, and its technology is advancing at a lightning-
quick rate.
With the prominence and exponential growth of the World Wide
Web over the last six yearsI and the increasing ease of uploading and
downloading text, graphics, and software, copyright law had found itself
behind the technological times.2 Should a company that provides Internet
access (online service provider or OSP) be held directly liable for the
copyright infringing acts of a customer? How would an answer to that
question be altered if such a company had no idea that infringing acts were
taking place?
In mid-July 1997, a bill was introduced by Representative Howard
Coble of North Carolina to combat this problem.3 Over the next year, this
bill was hotly debated in subcommittee hearings, with OSPs on one side
and copyright holders on the other. On October 28, 1998, the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was enacted into law.4 Within it lies the
"Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation" (Title II of the
1. Matthew Gray of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology states that although
slowing in its rate of growth (in 1993, the doubling period of the World Wide Web was un-
der three months), today's figures indicate that the Web's doubling period is under six
months, as measured by the number of hosts. Matthew Gray, Web Growth Summary (visited
Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.mit.edu/people/mkgray/net/web-growth-summary.html>.
2. Although all of intellectual property has been affected, this Note will focus solely
on copyright law.
3. H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. (1997).
4. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (to
be codified at scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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DMCA), the end result of the evolution of the Coble Bill. Title II is not
determinant of liability, rather it provides a defense that can be applied "if
the provider is found to be liable under existing principles of law."6 As the
title of the new statute indicates (referring, albeit fifteen months early, to
the "Millennium"), it is exactly what the copyright law needed to maintain
its relevance in today's Internet world.
This Note begins (Part I) with a basic introduction to the tort of
copyright infringement generally and as applied to OSPs prior to the pas-
sage of the DMCA. This Part concludes with an analysis of whether the
copyright law, as it stood, presented a problem at all. In Part III, this Note
turns to Congress's solution to the "problem"-the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. It analyzes the evolution of the DMCA from the original
Coble Bill through the text of the newly enacted law. It describes the con-
cerns on both sides of the debate and illustrates how Congress kept both
viewpoints in mind when composing the final draft of the DMCA. Finally,
this Note turns to Title II of the DMCA, discussing specific provisions of
the new law. This Note concludes that the DMCA is not "a solution in
search of a problem" at all.7 Rather, it is a necessary amendment to the
copyright law, bringing it up to date as the year 2000 draws ever closer."
II. THE TORT OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT PRE-DMCA
A. Copyright Infringement Generally
Copyright infringement, briefly defined, is a violation of at least one
of the six exclusive rights set out in section 106 of the Copyright Act.9
5. Id. secs. 201-203, § 512, 112 Stat. at 2877-86 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
6. 144 CONG. REC. H10,048, H10,067 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (Conference Report on
H.R. 2281, Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
7. Mike Kirk, on behalf of the American Intellectual Property Association, made this
comment at the subcommittee hearing for the original Coble Bill. See WIPO Copyright
Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act: Hearing on
H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 222 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Hearing]
(statement of Mike Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law Associa-
tion).
8. But see Daniel R. Cahoy, Comment, New Legislation Regarding On-Line Service
Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement: A Solution in Search of a Problem?, 38
IDEA 335 (1998). Cahoy argues that the then-pending DMCA was "a solution in search of
a problem" and that the law should not be changed unless the legislature can show "a defect
in the law or the judicial reasoning that has created that law." Id. at 359.
9. These exclusive rights are:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
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Section 501(a) provides that should any of these rights be violated
(notwithstanding defenses provided in sections 106 through 11810), the
violating person is deemed "an infringer of the copyright or right of the
author, as the case may be."' The policy behind the copyright law is to
provide incentive to authors to create and disseminate works to the public
without fear that those works will be copied and used to the credit and fi-
nancial gain of someone else.
Courts divide this relatively broad definition into three categories: di-
rect infringement, vicarious infringement, and contributory infringement.
Direct infringement is the affirmative action of violating an author's ex-
clusive rights under section 106 of the Copyright Act.12 Contributory in-
fringement generally occurs when one knowingly supervises the infringing
acts of another and the observer stands to benefit from the infringement.
3
Vicarious infringement "occurs when the defendant has the right or power
to supervise the acts of the direct infringer, and has a financial stake in the
infringing acts, even though the defendant had no knowledge of, or did not
directly participate in, the infringing acts."'
' 4
For decades, these torts shaped copyright law. For example, if a book
was sold that was a carbon-copy of one written years earlier by someone
else (who held a copyright in it), the person who copied the book without
permission would be liable for direct infringement. If such a person did so
within the scope of his or her employment and the employer had a finan-
cial stake in the acts, the employer could be held vicariously liable. If the
company knew that infringing activity was occurring, it could be liable for
contributory infringement. It is relatively easy to see how these three defi-
nitions work together. However, the 1990s brought a means of communi-
(3) to distribute copies.., of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual im-
ages of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. HI 1997).
10. These defenses are not within the scope of this Note and will not be discussed.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994).
12. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 9.1, at 285 (2d ed.
1995).
13. Id. § 9.20[A], at314.
14. Id. § 9.20[C], at 316 (emphasis added).
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cation to the forefront of popularity that had never been imagined, other
than by academics. This massive database known as the World Wide Web
would present an entirely new means for people to advertise their products,
communicate with one another, and easily download material and place it
elsewhere without permission.
B. Copyright Infringement on the World Wide Web: Application
to Service Providers
The first reaction of scholars and lawmakers upon the growth of this
new means of communication was, in essence, to do nothing. Obviously,
only holding a subscriber liable for infringement is unlikely to compensate
the copyright owner fully. Consequently, the deep pocket of the service
provider offers an alluring opportunity for the infringed party to get the
damages that person feels he or she deserves.
1. The Early Cases
When such a suit was brought and it became known that the OSP
knew of the infringing activity and did nothing to stop it, courts were quick
in finding the entity liable for contributory infringement. The policy for
this rule was obvious: The whole purpose of copyright law-giving incen-
tive to authors to bring creative works into the public market-would go
by the wayside if service providers were permitted to allow their custom-
ers to infringe as much or as little as they saw fit. Thus, this part of copy-
right infringement law did not present any unfairness to service providers.
A case involving the trading of unauthorized video games online provides
a good illustration.
In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA,15 Sega, a major manufacturer
and distributor of computer video game systems and programs, brought
suit against MAPHIA, an electronic bulletin board (BBS)16 and its system
operator, Chad Scherman. 17 Scherman acknowledged that MAPHIA users
were permitted to upload and download Sega games with an authorization
password. 8 The evidence also indicated that Scherman ran MAPHIA from
his home, using his own computer software and hardware.' 9 Essentially, he
15. Sega Enters., 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
16. A BBS is made up of electronic storage media that are connected by telephone lines
through modems and controlled by computers. Users can "upload" information from their
own computers to the storage media on the BBS. Likewise, users can "download" informa-
tion from the storage media to their own computers. Id. at 927.
17. Id. at 926-27.
18. Id. at 928.
19. Id. at 927.
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was his own service provider. Because he knowingly allowed users to up-
load and download unauthorized copies of Sega video games, he was
20found liable for contributory copyright infringement.
While Sega Enterprises involved a BBS and not the Internet or
World Wide Web, it is not beyond the stretch of imagination that its hold-
ing could have been extended to OSPs as well. Admittedly, in the short
history of OSP copyright infringement, there have been no cases involving
infringement on a Web site where the provider admitted (or was found) to
have had knowledge of the unlawful activity.2 ' Nevertheless, this seems to
be good law. If the OSP knew of infringing activity and did nothing to stop
it, the company (or individual) is, basically, sanctioning the activity and
should be found liable (and would be so found under the DMCA).
However, when courts in this area could not find knowledge of in-
fringing activity on the part of the OSP (thus being unable to establish
prima facie contributory infringement), they looked to and found liability
under direct infringement. Thus, regardless of knowledge, service provid-
ers were forced to pay damages for the infringing activities of their cus-
tomers. A case involving Playboy Enterprises shows that an online opera-
tor, prior to the passage of the DMCA, could be found liable for copyright
infringement even when such a person had no knowledge of infringing ac-
tivity.
22
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, George Frena, an operator of a
BBS, was sued as a result of infringing photographic images that were dis-
played on his service.2 For a fee, anyone could log on to his bulletin board
service and look at these pictures. Frena did not upload any of Playboy's
photographs onto his system and was not aware of any infringing activity
on the part of his subscribers2 He stated that as soon as he was made
aware of the infringing activity, he removed the unlawful photographs and
began monitoring his BBS so as to prevent additional infringing photo-
graphs from being uploaded.25 Once he was made aware of the unlawful
activity taking place on his BBS, Frena seemed to do everything within his
power to remedy the situation and took further steps to ensure that such
20. Id. at 933.
21. But see Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In this case, the court denied Netcom's motion for summary judg-
ment on the claim of contributory copyright infringement on the ground that a material is-
sue of fact existed as to whether Netcom had knowledge of infringing activity. Id. at 1374.
Netcom claimed it had no knowledge of any infringing activity. Id. at 1373.
22. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
23. Id. at 1554.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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action did not happen again. However, he was found liable for direct copy-.• •26
right infringement. Quoting the court: "There is no dispute that Defen-
dant Frena supplied a product containing unauthorized copies of a copy-
righted work. It does not matter that Defendant Frena claims he did not
make the copies itself."27
Although one could argue, probably quite successfully, that due to
the small size of his BBS, Frena could have monitored his system from its
inception to ensure that infringing activity did not occur, such a rule would
be unjust, indeed unreasonable, if applied to an Internet service provider.
Doing so would force such a company to monitor the thousands of users to
whom it provides Web sites. However, not everyone agreed that such a
rule would be unfair.
2. The Strict Liability Standard: The Inspiration
Holding service providers to the standards of strict or vicarious li-
ability was an idea of the Clinton-established Working Group on Intellec-
tual Property Rights (Working Group). In September 1995, the Working
Group published its final report, entitled Intellectual Property and the Na-
tional Information Infrastructure (White Paper).28 It recommended that
OSPs be held to the standard of strict liability, finding it "premature to re-
duce the liability of any type of service provider in the NiI environment." 29
Two years ago, concurrent bills (S. 1284 and H.R. 2441) were brought to
amend the Copyright Act to correspond with the recommendations of the
Working Group.30 However, proponents of the bills were not able to over-
come objections concerning infringement liability of OSPs. 31 Courts nev-
ertheless adopted a strict liability standard.
The main policy that supported the decision to impose a strict liabil-
ity standard for OSPs--even when such an entity is unaware of infringing
26. Id. at 1559.
27. Id. at 1556. But see Marobie-Fl, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983
F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. IM. 1997), where a court found that a service provider could not be
found vicariously liable for copyright infringement, comparing the OSP to the owner of a
photocopy machine: "Northwest only provided the means to copy, distribute or display
plaintiff's works, much like the owner of a public copying machine used by a third party to
copy protected material.*... Northwest did not actually engage in any of these activities it-
self." Id. at 1178.
28. BRUCE A. LEHMAN & RONALD H. BROWN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUcTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GRouP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995).
29. Id. at 122.
30. Bill Would Limit Liability for Infringement Occurring On-Line, 54 Patent, Trade-
mark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1336, at 231 (July 24, 1997).
31. Id.
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activity-was illustrated by Professor Jane C. Ginsburg of the Columbia
University School of Law in 1995. She argued from an economic stand-
point: "IT]he party having the 'right and ability to supervise' is best situ-
ated to pay for-or better, to prevent-infringement., 32 She further states
that enforcement is not meaningful unless its target is the deep pocket of a
commercial network operator or bulletin board.33
3. So, Was There a Problem with the Copyright Law in This Area?
There is little doubt that a problem existed. Perhaps service providers
four years ago had the ability to keep a watchful eye over their customers'
Web pages, but the immense size of the Web today makes such supervi-
sion almost impossible. By the calculation of Matthew Gray of the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, the World Wide Web has doubled itself
at least six times since the report's original publication three years ago,34
and eight times since Professor Ginsburg's article containing this conten-
tion was published.
Even in 1995, some believed that that the Internet was simply too
large to be policed. Robert D. Collet, Chairman of the Board and President
of Commercial Internet eXchange Association (CIX), a nonprofit trade as-
sociation that, as of 1995, was comprised of over 70 percent of the nation's
Internet service providers, expressed concern that the Internet was be-
coming too large to police effectively.35 He stated that the service provid-
ers that belong to CIX "transmit nearly half a billion messages each day,
and cannot realistically be expected to monitor the content of those trans-
,,36
missions.
One can understand Collet's concerns. The added burden of moni-
toring every message that passes through an OSP would dramatically in-
crease overhead costs. Many smaller service providers would have been
forced out of business. It follows that the OSPs that would be able to af-
ford such supervision would still have had to be quite discriminating as to
whom they granted access. Regardless, these increased costs would be
passed on to the consumer. Fifteen dollars a month for Internet access
would become a thing of the past. The Internet is for everyone, not just
32. Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhighway": Authors, Ex-
ploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUm. L. REv. 1466, 1493 (1995).
33. Id. at 1499.
34. See Gray, supra note 1.
35. Robert D. Collet, White Paper: A Brief Analysis of the Role of Internet Access Pro-
viders in the Copyright Law Revisions (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.eff.org/pub
/Intellectual-property/cix_ipwgpaper.comments>.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 51
THE COPYRIGHT DILEMMA
wealthy people who are able to afford an increase (probably significant) in
access costs.
It has also been argued that the legislature should not have acted in
the first place, as judges seemed to be creating an exception to the notions
of vicarious liability before the DMCA was passed into law.37 However,
just because a small handful of district court judges had held unknowing
OSPs not liable does not mean that that trend would have continued. It is
simply too early to tell. Without any guidance as to how to apply the law
(other than nonbinding cases from other jurisdictions), however, copyright
would have been at the mercy of judicial decision making. It is possible
that judges across the country would have altered the law so as to exempt
unknowing OSPs from liability (as Cahoy seems to suggest), but it is
equally possible that a decade from now there would have been different
precedent for every district. With legislation in place that adequately ad-
dresses the issue, the latter is now an impossibility. Without such new law,
the possibility would still exist that people such as George Frena39 would
still be held liable, even though unaware of infringing activity on their
networks. Relying on judges (as opposed to the legislature) to make these
laws would have left OSPs uncertain as to their potential for liability in
this area and thereby confused when considering the implementation of
precautionary measures. Congress needed to act.
Clearly, then, the law needed to change so as to better balance two
viable policies. It needed to adjust so as to facilitate the growth of the In-
teret as an economic and communications tool, while at the same time not
diminish the incentive to create new works. Clearly, requiring service pro-
viders to police their networks would have forced such companies to limit
access to the Internet and World Wide Web to the number of customers
they could viably police and charge more to those who are given access.
II. THE SOLUTION: TITLE II OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT
The DMCA was the final resolution of a debate that took place in
Congress for nearly a year and a half. This Part of the Note looks exten-
sively at the legislative history of the new law from Representative
37. "[S]uch action, as with any change in law, should be reserved for a showing of real
harm in the alternative.... By addressing problems on a case-by-case basis, the courts are
able to slowly build a coherent structure for analyzing liability that is fluid and responsive
to changes in technology." Cahoy, supra note 8, at 354.
38. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Marobie-Fl, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F.
Supp. 1167 (N.D. IM. 1997).
39. See supra Part II.B.1.
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Coble's initial bill4 to its present form. The first section of this Part looks
specifically at H.R. 2180, outlining the concerns on both sides of the de-
bate, as illustrated in the testimony of its subcommittee hearings as well as
offering a critique of the bill in its original form. The second section turns
to a newer version of the bill,41 which strives to answer some of the con-
cerns raised in the prior version's subcommittee hearings. The final section
examines the current law (Title II of the DMCA) and concludes that this
legislation was necessary to adequately protect copyright owners and com-
panies that provide online access.
A. H.R. 2180: The Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act
As a result of there being nothing in the Copyright Act specifically
addressing its applicability to service providers, Representative Coble saw
42the need to introduce this legislation. While there was judicially created
doctrine that addressed the question of OSP liability, such companies
sought greater assurance through legislation as to how the law-
specifically this doctrine-would apply to the Internet. 4
Representative Coble's rationale behind this bill was to provide "a
single exemption, written broadly so as to cover a range of acts" and to de-
vise an exemption based on the service provider's participation in the in-
fringing activity. 44 He stated:
The overall goal is to exempt conduct where liability does not seem
appropriate because of a low level of participation, control and knowl-
edge, while at the same time ensuring that adequate incentives remain
to assist copyright owners in preventing infringement,.. .without obli-
gating service providers generally to monitor or police communica-
tions over the Internet.45
To achieve this goal, Representative Coble wrote the bill to exempt
46
an OSP from liability when six circumstances are met. The bill also lim-
40. H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. (1997).
41. H.R. 3209, 105th Cong. (1998).
42. Representative Coble notes that this exemption is not limited to "service providers"
but can apply to anyone engaging in the covered activity. 143 CONG. REc. E1452, E1452
(daily ed. July 17, 1997) (statement of Rep. Coble).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. (a) ExEMPTIONS.-A person shall not be liable-
(1) for direct infringement, or vicariously liable for the infringing acts of an-
other, based solely on transmitting or otherwise providing access to material
on-line, if the person-
(A) does not initially place the material on-line;
(B) does not generate, select, or alter the content of the material;
(C) does not determine the recipients of the material;
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its remedies for contributory infringement when such an entity is exempt
from direct or vicarious liability and provides legal protection to those who
"act responsibly to assist in preventing infringement." 47
1. The Exemptions of the Coble Bill
The bill provided that should six particulars be met, a person would
not be liable for direct infringement nor vicariously liable for the unlawful
acts of others. This legislation was not intended to replace current law,
rather Representative Coble noted that if an OSP failed to meet each of the
exemptions, present doctrine would have governed the outcome.4
The first three requirements related strictly to the association of the
provider and the infringing material without regard to business practices or
state of mind. Basically, the only way these criteria could be met is if the
service provider was just that and nothing more. For example, if the OSP
had any control over what the content of the Web page was, it would not
qualify for the exemption and current doctrine would apply. The third re-
quirement was intended to be read very narrowly; it only required that the
entity not be the one to decide whom, specifically, would receive the mate-
rial.49 "The fact that the person may have control over the universe of pos-
sible recipients ... would not disqualify him or her, since the choice of all
subscribers does not determine which subscriber receives which mate-
rial."
50
The fourth and fifth provisions dealt with the business practice of the
service provider, as it related to the infringing material. Between the two,
an OSP would not qualify if it benefited financially from the infringement
.... 51
itself or advertised the infringing material. One can see that if either pro-
vision was not met, OSP knowledge of the infringing acts can be easily
(D) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to a particular
act of infringement;
(E) does not sponsor, endorse, or advertise the material; and
(F)(i) does not know, and is not aware by notice or other information indi-
cating, that the material is infringing, or
(ii) is prohibited by law from accessing the material[.]
H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1997).
47. 143 CoNG. REc. E1452, E1452 (daily ed. July 17, 1997) (statement of Rep. Coble).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. In Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994),
MAPHIA would not have qualified for the exemption due in part to these provisions. The
court found that Scherman, the system operator of MAPHIA, "specifically solicited this
copying and expressed the desire that these video game programs be placed on the
MAPHIA bulletin board for downloading purposes." Id. at 683.
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implied. If such an entity benefited financially from or advertised for the
information on one of its customers' Web pages, the bill seems to imply a
duty to check for infringing activity.
The sixth provision was the specific knowledge requirement. The
question for Representative Coble, when drafting this legislation, however,
was where on the scienter spectrum the knowledge of service providers in
these situations should be placed. Actual knowledge would encourage will-
ful blindness, while a negligence standard could be interpreted as creating
an affirmative duty on the part of OSPs to investigate-a duty Representa-
52tive Coble did not want to impose. A standard in between actual knowl-
edge and negligence was adopted: "[I]f a person becomes aware of infor-
mation that causes suspicion, he or she should have some obligation to
check further. 53 Thus, while there was no affirmative duty to constantly
police one's customers, an OSP, under the provisions of this bill, could not
ignore suspicious activity when it became aware of such activity.
2. The Debate
Within three months of the bill's introduction, hearings were con-
ducted before the subcommittee. A debate arose between copyright holders
and service providers regarding a knowledge standard. This Part outlines
these concerns, using the testimony from these hearings.
a. Position One: No Knowledge Standard Should Be Imposed for
OSPs.
Clearly, this was (and likely still is) the position taken by the creators
of creative works: motion picture producers, authors, composers, publish-
ers, and the like. Their concern rests on the notion that unless service pro-
viders could be held liable regardless of knowledge of infringing activity,
online piracy would be rampant, as copyright law would not adequately
protect their works. Adoption of legislation such as H.R. 2180 would re-
move any incentive on the part of service providers to police their custom-
ers' Web sites, placing a huge burden to do so on authors, composers, and
other copyright holders.
John Bettis, songwriter, on behalf of the American Society of Com-
posers, Authors, and Publishers, was concerned that if H.R. 2180 became
law (thus establishing a knowledge requirement for OSPs to be held liable
for infringement), the ability of copyright owners to secure their rights for
52. 143 CONG. REc. E1452, E1453 (daily ed. July 17, 1997) (statement of Rep. Coble).
53. Id.
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online uses of their works would be critically handicapped. 54 This would be
done in two ways: (1) placing the burden on the copyright owner to prove
that the OSP had knowledge would "make it extremely difficult, as a prac-
tical matter, for a copyright owner whose work was infringed to obtain re-
dress," and (2) imposing such a knowledge requirement forces the copy-
right owner to police the Internet for infringing works without assistance.
55
Looking at the policing aspect, he equated a copyrighted work to an auto-
mobile:
If someone steals my car, I can call the police and they will assist
me-indeed, they will do virtually all the work-in recovering it and
catching the criminals. But there is no police force to assist me and the
other creators of America's music when our songs are stolen. Yet these
songs are as much our property as our automobiles.
56
In sum, he was concerned that his rights as a copyright holder would
have been severely hindered by the proposed legislation. The burden of
policing the Web for infringing activity involving his copyrighted works
would be a daunting, almost impossible task, given the immense size of
the Internet.
Allee Willis, also a songwriter, on behalf of Broadcast Music, Inc.,
raised a more practical issue regarding the bill's affect on the award of
damages: "[I]f you want private copyright owners to continue to shoulder
the burden of enforcing their copyrights, . . we need strong civil damages
and strong liability laws."57 She argued that the livelihood of songwriters
depends on the use of their music through the Copyright Act, and by add-
ing a knowledge requirement for the benefit of service providers, Congress
would be "depriv[ing] songwriters of an income for that which [they] cre-
ate."
58
This bill would also have presented a significant problem to the pro-
ducers of software, who, according to Ken Wasch, President of the Soft-
59
ware Publishers Association, presently lose $12 billion per year to piracy.
His stance was that the then-current law was best; courts had fairly decided
online infringement suits that had been brought against network provid-
ers.6 He was unaware of any significant infringement cases involving
major service providers, such as America Online, and saw no compelling
54. WIPO Hearing, supra note 7, at 169 (statement of John Bettis, songwriter).
55. Id. at 169-70.
56. Id. at 170.
57. Id. at 161 (statement of Allee Willis, songwriter).
58. Id. at 158.
59. Id. at 119 (statement of Ken Wasch, President, Software Publishers Association).
60. Id. at 120. Recall that this was the same position taken by Daniel R. Cahoy in his
comment. See Cahoy, supra note 8.
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evidence of a "chilling effect," which would occur, as proponents of the
bill argue,61 if the then-current law remained unchanged. 62
While one can easily understand why producers of creative works
would want the law to remain as it was prior to the DMCA, there was one
arguably neutral organization that held the same position. Mike Kirk, rep-
resenting the American Intellectual Property Law Association, reiterated
Wasch's statement that no chilling effect of Internet growth had taken
place, nor were they aware of any infringement suits involving online
service providers or Internet access providers. 63 Thus, he questioned the
need for such legislation altogether-seeing the Coble Bill as "a solution
in search of a problem." 64
Certainly the arguments made by opponents of H.R. 2180 presented
some valid concerns. If the OSP did not police its Web pages for infring-
ing activity, who would? Without question, so the argument goes, these
entities are in the best position to do so. Further, by exempting the service
provider, would a remedy be available that adequately redresses injuries
suffered on the part of the copyright holder? Without the deep pocket of
the service provider, conceivably not. If society wants authors, composers,
and the like to continue to share their works with the public, copyright
rights must be given full protection. Anyone who has the capacity to pro-
tect against the violation of these rights must do so.
b. Position Two: A Knowledge Standard Should Be Applied to
OSPs.
It is also fairly obvious that the types of parties that would favor the
Coble Bill would be those involved in the providing of Internet and World
Wide Web access. If the law held OSPs vicariously liable for the infring-
ing acts of their customers when the provider is unaware of infringing ac-
tivity, too great of a burden would be placed on OSPs to police their cus-
tomers. This would drive small providers out of business and force large
providers to increase their access rates. Internet access would be reduced,
and it would fail to reach its potential as an electronic, information-based
communications medium.
61. See discussion infra Part lII.A.2.b.
62. WIPO Hearing, supra note 7, at 120 (statement of Ken Wasch, President, Software
Publishers Association).
63. Id. at 222 (statement of Mike Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual Prop-
erty Law Association).
64. Id.
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Roy Neel, on behalf of the United States Telephone Association
(USTA),6s argued that by allowing service providers to be found liable for
infringement when they are unaware of any infringing activity, the law
would be holding "the Internet itself' liable for copyright infringement.66
He pointed out that the way information travels through the local exchange
backbone and network components is in packets of ones and zeros. There
should be no liability here, as the content is unidentifiable. Further, when
information becomes available to the human eye, a cooperative system
should be instituted, wherein the copyright owner is responsible for identi-
fying infringing activity on his intellectual property and alerting the OSP,
which would then be under a duty to remove the infringing material.67 It
was his position that the level of knowledge that should be required of
service providers is actual knowledge, a standard higher than that in the
Coble Bill and the DMCA. Under his scheme, an OSP would only be liable
when it was made aware of infringing activity (thus given actual knowl-
edge) and did nothing about it.
While such a rule would lift nearly all responsibility from service
providers, it would open the door to willful blindness. An OSP would have
an incentive to purposefully ignore the activity of its customers so as to
avoid liability. However, not all service providers felt that this should be
the standard.
Ronald G. Dunn, President of the Information Industry Association,
saw no reason to go as far as Neel's position. Dunn's position revolved
around the notion that all parties must work together to ensure that piracy
is minimized.68 Although he supported the bill for the most part, he noted
that the "financial benefit exemption" 69 needed to be changed so as to en-
compass nonprofit service providers as well. 70 A simple change in lan-
guage would have this effect. Overall, he agreed with Neel's "cooperation"
sentiment, but believed that such a system requires some affirmative con-
duct on the part of the OSP, including making efforts to inform its users
about copyright and the penalties for infringement and to educate its em-
65. The USTA is a coalition of over 1,400 telephone companies, nearly all of which are
also service providers. Id. at 83 (statement of Roy Neel, President and Chief Executive Of-
ficer, USTA).
66. Id. at 84.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 174 (statement of Ronald G. Dunn, President, Information Industry Associa-
tion).
69. See H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1997) (citing proposed 17 U.S.C. §
512(a)(1)(D)).
70. WIPO Hearing, supra note 7, at 175 (statement of Ronald G. Dunn, President, In-
formation Industry Association).
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ployees about copyright law and the consequences of its violation.7' As to
a knowledge requirement, he supported H.R. 2180; he only felt that the
bill's provisions should be rewritten using more detailed language, so as to
clarify exactly which service providers would be exempt. He merely called
for the imposition of certain duties on service providers that, ideally,
would increase the likelihood of discovering infringing activity (a "know it
when you see it" approach).
The university setting provides a unique perspective on this issue. On
one hand, universities seek to advance the creative works of faculty and
students. On the other hand, the setting dictates that universities advocate
the growth of the Internet and World Wide Web as an educational tool.
M.R.C. Greenwood, Chancellor of the University of California, Santa
Cruz, believed that a law where "the degree of potential liability varies di-
rectly with the degree of control over intellectual property," such as Repre-
72sentative Coble's bill, was a good way to balance these two concerns.
This allows higher education institutions "to pursue the new education and
research opportunities provided by the digital environment while simulta-
neously preserving critical remedies against infringement for proprie-
tors. 73
Along with service providers, which have an enormous personal and
business interest in the imposition of a knowledge requirement, H.R. 2180
won the support of entities lacking such an interest. The Register of Copy-
rights, Marybeth Peters, also supported the "cooperation between copy-
right holder and service provider" notion,74 even though one would think
upon first glance at her occupation that she would be biased toward strict
liability. She stated that in the past, any legislation that sought to exempt
OSPs from liability: (1) should be calibrated to particular degrees of in-
volvement and responsibility; (2) should not contain mandatory extra-
judicial procedural requirements for copyright owners to be able to enforce
their rights; and (3) should not create incentives to avoid knowledge of in-
fringement.75 She saw this bill as meeting these criteria, finding that it
sought "to provide greater certainty while safeguarding the ability of copy-
right owners to protect their exclusive rights in an on-line environment.
71. Id. at 177.
72. Id. at 67 (statement of M.R.C. Greenwood, Chancellor of the University of Califor-
nia, Santa Cruz).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 53 (statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Clearly, making OSPs strictly liable for the infringing acts of cus-
tomers regardless of knowledge would present such entities with a daunt-
ing task. In order to effectively police the online activities of those to
whom they provide access-assuming that an effective method is possi-
ble---costs of that access to consumers would probably go up significantly.
No one has argued that service providers should be completely excluded
from liability in all situations. However, a law that would only punish
those providers that know (or should know) of infringing activity and fail
to take action seems to be truly just; those that are willing to remove in-
fringing information from their Web sites, but have no way of knowing
that such action is taking place, would be exempted from liability.
3. The Critique
The initial Coble Bill was a good start, as it showed that a problem in
the copyright law did exist and presented a viable solution. The main
problem with the bill was that it was simply too broad. If the point of this
bill (or, for that matter, any bill) was to not rely on judges and to provide a
rule, it must be sufficiently narrow to have that effect. The bill added a
knowledge standard to general notions of vicarious liability of OSPs, but it
did not look at specific situations where possible infringement could take
place. Almost assuredly, questions would have arisen in the courts as to
how far to extend its application.
Consider the following hypothetical situation. Suppose a user,
through OSP A operates a Web page (Page 1) with a link to another page
(Page 2), operated by a user through OSP B. The latter page contains in-
fringing material. Online service provider A then comes to find out about
the infringing works on Page 2, although OSP B has no knowledge of it.
Could OSP A be sued under a vicarious liability theory because it provided
the page with the link to the page containing the infringing material?
Should OSP A be under a duty to inform OSP B of the infringing acts of
OSP B's user? Add OSP C to the hypothetical. Online service provider C
has a link to Page 1 and becomes aware of the infringing activity of a user
of one of its competitors (OSP B, as it turns out). Should OSP C be vicari-
ously liable for providing the page, with the link to the page, with the link
to the page containing infringing material? What about search engines,
such as Yahoo or Excite, whose business it is to provide links based on a
user's search? It is a slippery slope that can be easily avoided through di-
rect legislation. Obviously, with no legislation, judges would have drawn
the line somewhere, and it is conceivable, perhaps even likely, that those
lines would have been in different places, depending on the jurisdiction.
This hypothetical situation illustrates that while a good start, H.R. 2180
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was simply so broad that lawyers (and, thereby, courts) would argue (find)
ambiguities, and differing judicial viewpoints could result.
On the other hand, it is clear that because computer technology
moves at such a quick rate, the legislation will, inevitably over time, lack
certain provisions that will seem basic five years from now, thus making it
seem outdated. Representative Coble was on the right track when he intro-
duced H.R. 2180; the bill simply left too much room for vastly different
interpretations.
B. H.R. 3209: An Amended Version of H.R. 2180
In mid-February 1998, Representatives Coble and Goodlatte of Vir-
ginia introduced an altered version of H.R. 2180-H.R. 3209.77 This modi-
fication was somewhat narrower, but not as narrow as what ultimately
78would become the DMCA. Using more refined language, it exempted an
OSP from vicarious liability "based solely on the intermediate storage and
transmission of material over that provider's system or network,' 79 subject
to a lack of knowledge standard. If the infringing activity was accom-
plished in a way other than that provided in paragraph (1), paragraph (3)
provided the umbrella, covering any conduct "other than conduct de-
scribed in paragraph (1)."'o
One can see that although this is narrower than H.R. 2180, the over-
arching provision in paragraph (3) presents the same problem of over-
breadth. Would caching or linking be included? Conceivably yes, but one
could argue (and it is possible that a court could hold) the reverse. The
legislation needed to address every conceivable way to transmit data.
Without a doubt, new, faster, and more efficient ways will be discovered in
the future, but the law can always be amended at that time. H.R. 3209 was
outdated from its inception.
In early April 1998, the House Judiciary Committee incorporated
H.R. 3209 into H.R. 2281, s1 the then-pending DMCA.s2 On the eve prior to
the incorporation, a compromise was reached between copyright owners
and OSPs on draft legislation that differed slightly from H.R. 3209.8' H.R.
77. H.R. 3209, 105th Cong. (1998).
78. See discussion infra Part I.C.
79. H.R. 3209, § 2(a).
80. Id.
81. H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1998) (enacted).
82. David N. Weiskopf, The Risks of Copyright Infringement on the Internet: A Practi-
tioner's Guide, 33 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 50 (1998).
83. Id. (citing Industry Groups Reach Accord on Online Copyright Liability Legisla-
tion, 55 PAT. TRADEMARK COPYRIGHT 557-58, 564-67 (1998)).
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2281 was later amended to include this agreementO On October 12, 1998,
Congress passed the modified version of the DMCA, clearing it for presi-
dential approval."5
C. Striking the Balance: Title II of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act
When the DMCA was signed into law on October 28, 1998, the de-
bate on OSP vicarious liability in the copyright arena finally came to an
end. Not only did it codify a knowledge standard for online service provid-
ers, but it did so in a narrow fashion-making it difficult to manipulate.
Earlier, this Note argued that having a statute in place would do what judi-
cial doctrine does not: It would provide OSPs with immediate certainty as
86to what the law is and what precautions to take. Title II of the DMCA not
only allows OSPs to be secure as to what exactly the law is, but reaches a
fair conclusion as to what that standard should be. The Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference states it best:
Title II preserves strong incentives for service providers and copyright
owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements
that take place in the digital networked environment. At the same time,
it provides greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal
exposure for infringements that may occur in the course of their ac-
tivities. 87
This section examines Title II of the DMCA and concludes that this
new law complies with the demands of technological innovation. Moreo-
ver, it is drafted in such a way (narrowly, as will be illustrated) as to allow
OSPs to know what their role in the "policing for infringement" process is.
1. Coverage
Four categories of conduct by an OSP are the basis for the new limi-
tations: transitory digital network communications, system caching, stor-
age of information on systems or networks at the direction of users, and
information-locating tools or "links."
a. Transitory Digital Network Communications
This subsection covers actions by a user where the OSP acts as noth-
ing more than a conduit. Nothing is stored for any length of time, as only
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See supra Part II.B.3.
87. 144 CONG. REc. H10,048, H10,067 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (Conference Report on
H.R. 2281, Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
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"intermediate and transient storage" applies here.88 Thus, the ability of a
service provider to gain knowledge of infringing activity is nearly non-
existent. An example here would be e-mail. If a user sends a copyrighted
work without permission (as an attachment) to another user, the provider
that the infringer used to send the e-mail could be exempted from mone-
tary liability, should the actions of the OSP meet five requirements, each
of which sets out a very specific circumstance that must exist for the entity
89to be able to use this provision.
This list of circumstances seems to be a brainstorm of all the ways an
OSP could become aware of infringing activity on the part of its users. The
material must have been initiated by someone other than the provider, be
transmitted without modification, 9' and the service provider may have no
part in selecting the recipients of the material (other than as an "automatic
response to the request of another person").2 Further, the transmission
must have been carried out "through an automatic technical process with-
out [the OSP's] selection of the material" 93 and no copies of the material
made in the course of this process are permitted to be retained in the sys-
tem for any time longer than that which is "reasonably necessary for the
transmission. 94
b. System Caching
"Caching" is defined in this provision as "the intermediate and tem-
porary storage of material on a system or network." 95 Note the difference
between caching and transitory communications, covered in the previous
section. In transitory communications, information is stored only as long
as it takes for the transmission (e-mail, for example) to reach the other
party. Caching is temporary storage as well, but it involves storage for a
longer period of time than that of transitory communications. The OSP,
therefore, has more of an ability to learn about infringing activity with
caching than with transitory communications (although the likelihood of
discovering such activity without notice is still very remote).
88. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, see. 202, § 512(a), 112
Stat. 2860, 2877-78 (1998) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
89. Id.
90. Id. § 512(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 2878 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
91. Id. § 512(a)(5) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
92. Id. § 512(a)(3) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
93. Id. § 512(a)(2) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
94. Id. § 512(a)(4) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
95. Id. § 512(b)(1) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
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There are three basic requirements. The material must have been put
online by someone other than the OSP,9 6 the transmission of the material
must have been at the direction of the person who made the material avail-
able online,97 and the storage of the material must have been through "an
automatic technical process for the purpose of making the material avail-
able to users of the system.., who.., request access... from [such a
person]." 98
Further, the transmission itself must meet certain conditions. First,
the material must be transmitted "without modification to its content from
the manner in which the material was transmitted." 99 Second, the service
provider must comply with rules concerning updating material when speci-
fied by the user "in accordance with a generally accepted industry standard
data communications protocol," although this only applies when such rules
are not used by the user "to prevent or unreasonably impair [such] inter-
mediate storage. ' 0° The third condition mandates that the OSP did not in-
terfere with the ability of technology to return to the user information that
would have been directly available to subsequent users.' °
Two other conditions are dependent on other circumstances. First, if
the user has a condition in effect that a person must meet prior to having
access to the material (such as a password, paying a fee, etc.), the service
provider must limit access to the stored material to those who have met
those conditions. 1° Finally, if the OSP is notified'03 that a user makes mate-
rial available online without permission from the copyright owner, the
OSP must have acted "expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the
material that is claimed to be infringing."'14
96. Id. § 512(b)(1)(A) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
97. Id. § 512(b)(1)(B) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
98. Id. § 512(b)(1)(C) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
99. Id. § 512(b)(2)(A) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
100. Id. § 512(b)(2)(B) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
101. Id. § 512(b)(2)(C), 112 Stat. at 2879 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.). Although appli-
cability would apply
only if that technology-(i) does not significantly interfere with the performance
of the provider's system.., or with the intermediate storage of the material; (ii) is
consistent with generally accepted industry standard communications protocols;
and (iii) does not extract information from the provider's system or network other
than the information that would have been available to the... [user] if the subse-
quent users had gained access to the material directly from that person.
Id
102. Id § 512(b)(2)(D) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
103. See id. § 512(c)(3), 112 Stat. at 2880 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.), which lists the
elements of notification.
104. Id. § 512(b)(2)(E), 112 Stat. at 2879 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.). Note that this
subparagraph only applies when
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c. Information Residing on Systems or Networks at the Direction
of Users
As evidenced by the term "residing," this limitation covers storage of
material for a longer period of time than simple "caching." This type of
storage is nearly permanent-at least as permanent as anything can be on-
line. Although the likelihood of no-notice discovery of infringing activity
is still very low, it is surely higher if the material is transferred in this way
(as opposed to caching or transitory communication). An example is in-
formation on a Web page.
Due to this distinction, the requirements that must be met to fall un-
der this exception differ from the previous two means of transferring in-
formation. First, the service provider cannot have actual knowledge that
the material is infringing, 10 5 nor can the OSP be "aware of facts or circum-
stances from which infringing activity is apparent."' 6 Further, if an OSP
comes across such knowledge, it must have acted "expeditiously to re-
move, or disable access to, the material."' °7 Second, the OSP must not have
received any "financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activ-
ity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to con-
trol such activity. ' " Finally, if the OSP is notified pursuant to the ele-
ments of notification'09 of claimed infringement, the provider must have
"respond[ed] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material
that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activ-
ity. ,
, 1°
This subsection also requires OSPs that expect to invoke this limita-
tion to designate an agent to receive notification of claimed infringement:
It must provide the Copyright Office with the name, address, phone num-
(i) the material has previously been removed from the originating site or access to
it has been disabled, or a court has ordered that the material be removed from the
originating site or that access to the material on the originating site be disabled;
and (ii) the party giving the notification includes in the notification a statement
confirming that the material has been removed from the originating site or access
to it has been disabled or that a court has ordered that the material be removed
from the originating site or that access to the material on the originating site be
disabled.
Id. § 512(b)(2)(E)(i)-(ii) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
105. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i), 112 Stat. at 2880 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
106. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
107. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
108. Id. § 512(c)(1)(B) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
109. See id. § 512(c)(3) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
110. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.). Recall the case of Playboy Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993), discussed supra Part H.B.1. Had
this case been tried today, Frena would seem to fall within these parameters (assuming he
complied with the statutory formalities).
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ber, e-mail address of the agent, as well as any other information that the
Register of Copyrights "may deem appropriate."'' 1
d. Information Location Tools or "Links"
This exception is quite different than that of the first three-no stor-
age (or passage) of information is taking place. Rather, this provision pro-
tects those OSPs that provide a Web page that refers or "links" users to
another page that contains infringing material. This section covers every
form of referral, from the link at the bottom of a personal Web page to a
search engine like Yahoo or Excite.
Further, the wording of the requirements that a service provider must
meet under this subsection is virtually identical to those covering
"Information Residing on Systems or Networks." Basically, an OSP can-
not have actual knowledge, constructive knowledge, or receive any finan-
cial benefit directly attributable to the infringing material (in such a case
when the OSP has "the right and ability to control such activity"). Upon
obtaining such knowledge (or receiving notification pursuant to the ele-
ments of notification in the subsection (c)(3)), the service provider must
have acted swiftly in removing or blocking access to the material."1
2. Observations
The above establishes, indeed demonstrates, that there was an im-
plicit congressional intent to take the law in this area completely out of the
judge's hands so as to provide uniformity among jurisdictions. By wording
the statute as narrowly as it did, Congress did well in showing online
service providers exactly what is expected of them in the fight to protect
copyrighted works. Title II makes clear throughout that any service pro-
vider with actual knowledge (or constructive knowledge, as defined in the
statute) is not immune from liability. Moreover, it rewards those OSPs
(like George Frena) that, once made aware of infringing activity, act
quickly to remove (or block access to) the infringing material.
The main thing it does not do--and rightfully so-is force OSPs to
police their networks. Doing so would greatly increase overhead costs,
forcing the public to pay significantly increased access fees. It would not
make sense, by analogy, to hold the builder of a road liable for a car acci-
dent that takes place upon it (assuming no defect in the road exists that in
any way contributed to the cause of the accident), and it does not make
111. § 512(c)(2), 112 Stat. at 2880 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
112. See &L § 512(d), 112 Stat. at 2881 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
113. Id. § 512(d)(3) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.). See also "Limitation on Liability of
Nonprofit Educational Institutions," id. § 512(e) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
sense to force service providers to constantly police their "roads" for in-
fringing activity.
Congress's resolution of the debate between copyright holders and
service providers was fair. Both parties now have an incentive to minimize
infringement. While the copyright holder's incentive is obvious, the serv-
ice provider, once it is made aware of infringing activity either on one of
its Web pages or on a page that its Web page links to, will be inclined to
remove the material as quickly as possible--doing so will ensure that it
will be exempt from possible future liability. Therefore, copyright holders
are better protected as well. Tad Crawford, publisher for Allworth Press in
New York City, agrees: "[T]he Act provides much-needed protection for
the copyright owners of materials that are available and transmitted on-
line.
, ,14
Furthermore, Congress took steps to protect service providers from
people "crying wolf." By implementing the elements of notification" 5 and
discussing "misrepresentations, ' 16 it increased the likelihood that when an
OSP receives a warning that material on its network is infringing, such no-
tice will be truthful. It therefore removes anxiety on the part of such enti-
ties for another potential for liability-wrongful removal of noninfringing
works.
All in all, a fair resolution seems to have been reached that "extend[s]
new protections to copyright owners to help them guard against the theft of
their works in the digital era. At the same time.... the critical balance in
the copyright law between the rights of copyright owners and users" was
" 17
preserved. Without question, there will come a time, probably sooner
than later, when this legislation will have to be amended, but today it is
exactly what copyright law needs: A knowledge standard applied to online
service providers drafted in such a way as to give OSPs a clear idea as to
what they need to do to avoid liability.
114. Tad Crawford & Laura Mankin, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Tying Up
the Loose Ends of Fair Use and Protected Online Content, EDITORIAL EYE, Feb. 1999, at 3.
115. See § 512(c)(3), 112 Stat. at 2880 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
116. See id. § 512(f), 112 Stat. at 2882 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.), which discusses
potential liability of any person who knowingly materially misrepresents that material is
infringing or was removed by mistake. See also id. § 512(g) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.).
This provision protects an OSP from being sued by a copyright holder or an alleged in-
fringer for damages resulting from the wrongful removal of copyrighted works as a result of
a false report that the removed work infringed copyright.
117. 144 CONG. Rac. E2166, E2166 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Boucher).
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IV. CONCLUSION
There comes a time in the life of any law where it needs to adjust to
the changing times. As one publication put it: "ThIe nature of cyberspace
itself hinders the traditional development of law simply because it moves
so fast; the technology has a tendency to overtake the legal issues."118 At
the time the Copyright Act of 1976 was drafted, a communications me-
dium such as the Internet and today's World Wide Web was unimaginable
to most, similar to the idea of a horseless carriage traveling a quarter of a
mile in less than ten seconds during the Civil War.
Times had changed. Online service providers were confused. Con-
gress had to act. If Congress had simply allowed judges to create doctrine
in this area, it would have been years before any definite and controlling
rules would have existed. This would have caused copyright law to con-
tinue to lag behind the digital times and caused OSPs to protect themselves
at the expense of the innocent user. One thing surely is not fair-the law
should not punish the entire Internet community for the actions of a few
infringing users.
Therefore, the DMCA was and is a necessary amendment to the
copyright law, not "an answer in search of a problem." It allows the Inter-
net to prosper as a communications medium while, at the same time, pro-
tecting the rights on which creators depend. Most importantly, it brings the
copyright law up to date as the twenty-first century approaches.
118. Carole E. Handler & Craig A. Guthery, Cyberspace Licensing: Linking, Framing,
and Caching, CYBERSPACE LAW., Dec. 1998, at 2.
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